Introduction
Prediction of polymer lifetimes is an important challenge for the polymer industry, particularly for materials expected to perform reliably for extended time periods (e.g., decades). It is also critically important for comparing new material formulations during their development. This paper briefly__Eeview>so_rneof the state-of-the-art lifetime prediction methods available for commercially formulated eki$toriie~s"exposed to oxygen, humidity andlor high-energy radiation environments. Important complications and pitfalls associated with such methods are highlighted.
Discussion
Simplistic Arrhenius Approach. Hktorically, the vast majority of accelerated aging studies have utilized the so-called Arrhenius methodology.
In the simplest instance, tbk approach assumes that a chemical reaction is responsible for the degradation and uses classical chemical rate theory to predict that the reaction rate -exp(-Ea/R7), where l?. is the activation energy of the reaction, R is the gas constant and 7'is the absolute temperature. Plots of the log of the rate constant (or the failure time for a degradation variable) versus inverse Tare predicted to give linear behavior. If confirme~the linear behavior is then extrapolated to the use T to predict use lifetime. Fkgure 1 shows induction (failure) time data analyzed in this fashion for three degradation parameters of an EPDM material. Arrhenius behavior is confirmed for the induction time data and the linearity is extrapolated to 25"C, leading to a predicted lifetime of 55,000 years. Although long life is predicted ffom the extrapolation, the large extrapolation distonce gives little confidence in the resuk. Irr fact, there are numerous phenomena that can lead to non-Arrhenius behavior. Several of these will be dkcussed briefly below, including the presence of more realistic reaction kinetics that can lead to or predict non-Arrhenius behavior] and physical subtleties involving the sorbed concentration of reactant gas (heat of solution effects for hydrolysis, diffusion effects for oxidation3,4).Many other phenomena that con lead to non-Arrhenius behavior will not be covered. These include changes that otlen occur when the data region or extrapolation range encompasses a polymer transition (Z" or Tw) and antioxidant complications caused by sohrbility changes with T and evaporation effects.s'fi Sohrbility Effects. For aging in air, if [02] , the concentration of dissolved Oz, atTectsthe oxidation rate, changingT usually leads to a change in [OJ. Because Henry's Law, which predicts a linear relationship between [0,] and gas phase 0, partial pressure holds at each T, Arrhenius behavior is not impacted (the measured activation energy will equrd the trueEa plus the Oz heat of solution). A more complicated sitnation occurs when hydrolysis dominates the degradation of a material since Henry's Law behavior is often inappropriate. By understanding how water vapor sorption curves depend on temperature, Arrhenius behavior can be recovered as long as data are taken and analyzed at constant relative humidky ( Realistic Oxidation Scheme for Stabilized Polymers. When oxygen is present during degradation of polymers, oxidation effects normally dominate degradation. Typical kinetic oxidation schemes are based on variants of the so-called basic auto-oxidation scheme (BAS) derived many decades ago by Bolkmd7, Batemans and co-workers. Analysis of thk scheme] for stabilized polymers leads to the following expression for the oxidation rate (1) dt l+CJOJ C, and Cz are constants involving the rate constants of the individual reactions in the kinetic scheme and [OJ is the dissolved Oj concentration. Thk implies that the oxidation rate wilI generally depend upon the concentration of dissolved 02. At low [02] , the rate will be proportional to [OJ; at the other limit of high [OJ, the rate will be independent of [OJ. It is easy to show that rigorously-Arrhenius behavior only occurs at the low [01] limit. 1 Time-temperature Superposition. Equation (1) implies a constant oxidation rate at each aging~thk is consistent with experimental observations on many stabilized elastomers.g Since tlds implies a constant acceleration of the degradation when T increases, the time-dependent degradation curves at two temperatures should be related by a constant multiplicative shift factor defined as c+. This leads to a concept called timetemperature superpositionY*Owhere all of the data (as opposed to a typical analysis which uses one processed data point per curve-see Fig. 1 ) at the experimental Ts are superposed to a reference T with empirically chosen shift factors. Figure 3 shows superposed results for elongation data of a nitrile rubber at a reference 7'of 64.5°C (the empirically derived a= values arc noted on the figure). when the empirical aT values are plotted on an Arrhenius plot (Fig. 4, squares) , the observed linearity confirms Amhenius behavior.
Diffusion-Limited Oxidation (DLO) Effects. We saw above that the oxidation rate can depend and, in fac~does dependlJ on the dksolved Oz concentration for stabilized elastomers. This implies that DLO effects can occur whenever the rate of oxidation in the material exceeds the rate at which the dissolved Oz can be replenished by dlffosion tiom the surrounding air atmosphere.3.4'J It turns out that such DLO effects are commonly obsewed for accelerated aging of elastomers. 1.4,9These effects can be monitored experimentally by several methods,'] including modulus profiling.12Moduhrs profiling results' showing important DLO effects are plotted in Fig. 5 for the nitrile rubber material aged for selected times at 12S°C. Such DLO effects can also be predicted qirantitatively from modeling if estimates or measurements of the 02 consumption rate and permeability coefficient are available.4J3 It may at first seem surprising that the nitrile material gives excellent t-Tsuperposition (Fig. 3) and Arrhenius behavior (squares in Fig. 4) given the importance of DLO effects (Fig. 5) . This turns out to be fortuitous for tlds and many other oven-aged elastomers since the elongation is usually dominated by surface hardening, which is untiected by DL0.1'9 1.0r enters in add~lon to T and gaseous reactant (e.g., 02 or HzO), For example, for materials aging in nuclear power plants, high-energy radiation can become significant in addhion to T and 02. Even though such situations would seem to be intractable, it is often ,possible to derive sufficient knowledge of the underlying chemistry'4 such that quantitative models for multi-stress environments can be derived and confirmed. 15Tlds work allowed us to materials. ClearIy, 60 degradation mechanism ukrasensitive analytical technique related to the is needed to access Ts in the extrapolation regions. One approach that has been successful is 02 consumption measurements that typically allow data to be taken at Ts 40 to 60"C lower than the Iower T limit 1~Such memmements were made ffom 9G"C of conventional measurements. ' down to 23°C for the nitrile materially After t-T superposition of the results, shift factors for 02 consumption were derived. When plotted on Fig. 4 (solid circles), it is clear that the oxidation mechanism has the same E. down to room temperature, confirming the extrapolation of mechanical properties. Similar experiments on the EPDM materird showed that the E, dropped substantially in the extrapolation region, leading to a significant reduction in the predicted room temperature lifetime. ' Combined Radiation and Temperature Environments. Predicting lifetimes can get even more complex when an additional environmental stress ?   4   425°C  1  I  I  I  I  1  0  20  40  60  80 100 P,% Ultrasensitive 02 Consumption to Test Extrapolation Assumption. A final problem with the Arrhenius approach is the unconfirmed extrapolation of high T accelerated results to much lower Ts (Figs. 1 and 4) . To minimize the extrapolation, long-term accelerated data should be obtained, as was done (up to -2 year exposures) for the EPDM (Fig. 1 ) and the nitrile (13g. 3) explain degradation rates that were observed to occur 10 to 100 times faster than expected.
Conclusions
Regardless of the stress environments acting on polymers, it should be c[ear that t-T superposition is the analysis method of choice when attempting to understand and extrapolate the 7' dependence of degradation. It is also critically important to monitorhrnderstand DLO effects, minimize extrapolation dk.taoces and use ultrasensitive analytical techniques to probe the extrapolation region. Although a great deal has been learned about better methods for predicting polymer lifetimes, much more research needs to be accomplished in thk important area. More work focussing on understanding the complex chemical pathways underlying degradation will aid in developing better extrapolation approaches. Additional ukrasensitive methods for following degradation at low temperatures will allow more confident extrapolations. in an underground geologic repository_sited in unsaturated tui% This analysis is intended to provide interim guidance to the DOE for the management of the SNF while they prepare for ilnal compliance evaluation. This report presents results from a Nuclear Dynamics Consequence Analysis (NDCA) that examined the potential consequences and risks of criticality during the longtenn disposal of spent nuclear fuel owned by the U.S. Dep&ent of Energy's Office of Environmental Management (DOE/13M). This analysis investigated the potential of postclosure criticality, the consequences of a criticality excursion, and the probability frequency for post-closure criticality. The results of the NDCA are intended to provide the DOE/EM with a technical basis for measuring risk which can be used for screen@g arguments to eliminate post-closure criticality FEPs (features, events and processes) from consideration in the compliance assessment because of either low probability or low consequences.
The purpose of this 1997 criticality study is to identifi for the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) the potential for criticali~and the consequences of defense spent nuclear fuel (DNSF) and defense high-level waste (DHLW) after disposal. The disposal site under study is the potential repository in unsaturated tuff at Yucca Mounti@ Nevada.
The study is part of a broader DOE program, the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP), for developing a safe, cost-effective technical strategy for the interim management and ultimate disposition of the foreign and domestic spent nuclear fuel (SNF) under the DOE's jurisdiction. The DOE-owned DNSF and DHLW are currently stored at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (TNIZEL),the Hanford Waste Vitrification Pkmt (HWVP), the Savannah River PlanG and other DOE sites. The SNF originated in military and experimental reactors; the high-level waste (HLW) W= generated during reprocessing of the SNF.
Organization of Report
The executive summary (Voh.une 1) reviews the scope and method of analyses, but its emphasis is on the important ideas and conclusions of the Nuclear Dynamics Consequences Analysis (NDCA). Volume 2 is a detailed account of the NDCA. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the study, its technical objectives, and a description of the models. Chapter 2 outlines the current status of related regulations and the relationship of this study to other analyses. Chapters 3 through 6 describe the models used in the NDCA, the static criticality model (Cm, the nuclear dynamics models (UDX/DTHX), the thermal-hydrologic transport model (THX), and the probability model (PIL4). Results are -summarizedin Chapter 7. Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter 8. The appendices provide supporting techuical data.
Suggested Use of Report
. For a summary of the results, refer to the Executive Summary (Volume 1).
q For an overview of the entire criticality analysis process, refer to Chapter 1, Introduction (volume 2).
ii q For specific details pertaining to analysis models, refer to the individual chapters and appendices (Volume 2).
Related Documents
The criticality study is an integral part of the performance assessment (PA) of DOEowned DSNF/DHLW in the potential Yucca Mountain repository. The' current PA (Rechard 1997) is the third phase of a study that was begun in 1993. The 1993 PA evaluated waste treatment options, ranging from no condition to codisposal to fi.dl reprocessing, by studying the performance of five potential waste forms. For the 1993 PA 12,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of waste were emplaced in two hypothetical repositories, one sited in granite (saturated) and the other in salt. In the 1994 PA, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) assessed one treatment option (direct disposal) for five types of SNF and three treatment options for calcined HLW in a 12,000-MTHM hypothetical repository in unsaturated luff. The PAs were documented in the following reports:
Rechard, R. P., ed. 1993. ... 
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Figures
Integration of nuclear criticality analysis into repository performance assessment.
Typical criticality cuwe for a fixed fissile concentration.
Typical criticality surface for a selections of fissile concentrations.
Typical near-field criticality S-curve.
Typical far-field criticality S-curve (extracted from the criticality surface of Figure ES-3 ).
Typical criticality saddle generated from a series of criticality S-curves for various fissile enrichments.
Comparison of filly-coupled nuclear dynamics results with uncoupled nuclear dynamics results.
Scaling law for uncoupled nuclear dynamics calculations. . This analysis investigated the potential of postclosure criticality, the consequences of a criticality excursion, and the probability frequency for post-closure criticality. The results of the NDCA are intended to provide the DOE/EM with a technical basis for measuring risk which can be used for screening arguments to eliminate post-closure criticality FEPs (features, events and processes) from consideration in the compliance assessment because of either low probability or low consequences.
ES.2 Introduction
This report discusses the post-closure nuclear criticality aspects of DOE-owned spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) im a disposal system similar to the potential repository at Yucca Mountain Site (YMS). The results of this study are intended to be combined with a performance assessment (PA) of long term disposal of the DSNF in the potential repository. The petiorrnance assessment is used to help guide DOE/EM with its concerns regarding the preparation of DSNF for permanent disposal. The DSNF and defense high level waste (DHLW) studied in this report are currently stored at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), the Hanford reservation, the Savannah River Site, other DOE sites, and universities.
The overall findimzs of this re~ort is that nuclear criticali~is not a sitificant contributor to Dost-closure ret)ositom releases to the accessible environment. The risks of criticali~, measured in the metric of additional fissions, are below the roundoff of the inventory source term. The results reported here correspond to extensive parametric studies that --span expected ranges for physical conditions, such as fissile mass, fissile concentration, enrichmen~porosity of assembly, groundwater, and saturation. The data are present to allow insight into key aspects to be considered with regard to criticality k a geologic repository.
In this repo~the term "criticality" applies to geologic repository pefiorma.uce assessment. For geologic repositories, criticality means consequences of an actual criticality (rather than criticality stiety as defined for surface storage). When the consequences of criticality are combined with probability frequency, as calculated through a probabilistic risk assessment (PIL4), the result is a risk measure. The metric ES-1 used is additional fissions, which can be directly compared to the initial radiological source term. Currently, probability frequencies for these consequences indicate that any additional fissions are unlikely to add to the surface biological hazards caused by the disposal of SNF and HLW materials. The results of this study were formulated for use in the support of the features, events, and processes (FEPs) screening arguments to eliminate criticality as an event for consideration in the performance assessment of the potential repository at the Yucca Mountain Site. Figure ES-1 identifies the integration of criticality data into the DSNF PA. The FEPs screening arguments for nuclear criticality can be based on low: 1) probability of occurrence (criticality potential), and/or 2) consequences of occurrence (nuclear dynamics).
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ES.3 Criticality Geometries
In the NDCA, the measure of risk was calculated for criticality during long-term disposal of DSNF. First, the potential for criticality was calculated. In the modeled repository, the waste containers are assumed to be placed on concrete piers. For analysis, nuclear criticality was assumed to occur at three locations: ES.3.1 Internal Internal geometries are where the fissile material is still in the original container. The SNI? container and its internal components (fiel elements, grid spacers, etc.) may be corroded or degraded, but the waste container structure would remain in its original location and produce the highest fissile atom-density for any geometry. Key aspects of this scenario include: a) Method of waste container corrosion (e.g., canister corrosion from the bottom upward versus from the top downward). b) Transport of neutron poison compared to fissile material transport. ES.3.Z Near Field Near-field geometries are where the fissile material is no longer in the waste container structure in the original location but is within one tunnel diameter of the origir@ location. The near-field geometries investigated in this study were: a) Rust/uranium near-field in which the container is completely corroded and yields a hemispherical slump of rust and fissile material. This geometry was analyzed for various conditions, e.g., reflectio~saturation, and addition of neutron poisons. b) Concrete/uranium near-field in which the fissile material has migrated from the original container and/or rust slump into the concrete inverts within the repository. ES.3.3 Far-Field Far-field geometries are where the fissile material has been transported via groundwater to distant locations where it may have reconcentrated in pores, fractures, or rock vugs due to precipitation, mineralization, or any other process. A key aspect of this type of criticality is the enrichment of the fissile material at these distant locations. For significant fissile mass to concentrate at these locations, the corrosion leachate plumes horn multiple containers must commingle through a common drain. Since the DOEowned SNFS are to be dispersed among commercial SNFS, the commingled leachate will have a low enrichment. Even more importantly, highly-enriched SNFS will be placed in containers with DHLW as a dilutant. Hence, various fissile enrichments were investigated in order to identifi fix-field enrichment limits which can be compared to repository average enrichments (see Table ES -l) . It is important to note that even though the average void space for the Topopah Springs tuff is 13.9'%o, there is no indication that water driven fissile movement can uniformly distribute within the tuff. Also, not all of the pore spaces are interconnected for both transport and/or accumulation of either fissile material or water. 
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Even though EPA units (doses surrogate for health risks) are no longerapplicableto YMP (i.e., 40 CFR 191 was remanded for application to YMP), they are presented here to illustrate that DOE-owned inventory represents approximately one part in a hundred of the overall risks.
ES-5
ES.4 Models Used and Analysis Codes Used for Criticality Analysis
Five models were used in the NDCA computational effort to model SNF that exhibit negative thermal feedback effects. These models were needed to perform the large number of calculations for nuclear criticality potential, consequences of an individual nuclear excursio~probabilities for initiation of a criticality, and probability frequencies for continuous criticalities. A brief description of these models is listed below
ES.4.1 CX Model (Criticality Potential Model)
The CX model uses IWOmajor computational codes: RKeff (generated as part of the NDCA project) and MCNP (an existing industry standard code for neutral particle transport). The RKeff code was developed as a pre-and post-processor for eigenvalue (static criticality, IQ calculations which identi~the criticality potential of a fissile assembly. The code requires up to twelve input variables including: fissile mass, fissile concentration, model geometry shape, and saturation in the rock matrix. RKeff generates complete MCNP input files that are then used to identi~whether an assembly of fissile material is subcritical, critical, or supercritical. Results are processed to identi@ critical fissile mass and concentration values necessary for given geologic conditions to result in a critical assembly. The critical mass and concentration values are then used in the THX, UDX, and DTHX models. The CX calculations were performed in a four step process:
A 3-D MCNI? model is generated for a baseline case study, which has a set of fixed parameters such as fissile material, enrichment, host rock type, and geologic quantities such as porosity and saturation. Then, for a fixed 15ssileconcentration, a series of static criticality calculations were petiormed for various masses. These values are plotted in a two dimensional curve termed a "criticality cume". A typical criticali~cume can be seen in Figure ES-2. A new fissile concentration value is identified and the processes in Step A are repeated. This is perfo~ed for a multitude of concentration values and the results represent a two-dimensional parametric study of~as a fiction of fissile mass and fissile concentration. The results can be plotted as three dimensional curves termed "criticality surfaces", which are accumulations of criticality curves. Typical results can be seen in Figure ES-3 . Using results from Step B, a criticality buckling search is performed. This corresponds to the identification of sets of fissile mass and concentration values that are necessary to yield a critical assembly (i.e.,~fi = 1.0). The results can be .-plotted in a two-dimensional curve termed a "criticality S-curve". Typical results from this step can be seen in Figures ES-4 and ES-5. A set of S-curves (fkom Step C) can be obtained for a variation in a baseline parameter such as fissile enrichment. The results are plotted in a 3-D curve termed a "criticality saddle". Typical results carI be seen in Figure ES From the above description it can be recognized that the development of criticality Scurves and saddles requires a large computational effort since each point on these curves corresponds to an eigenvalue search. In this study, key S-curves were generated for fissile material in near-fields consisting of rust and concrete host rock materials and also Es-6 for fro-fields consisting of Topopah Springs tuff host rock (see Chapter 3). These calculations identifi yhich mixtures of fissile material and host rock that could not generate a critiwdity assembly. The masses for those situations that may yield a critical assembly are the basis for thermal hydrology and nuclear dynamic calculations.
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ES.4.2 THX Model (Thermal Hydrology Model)
The THX model determines the transient thermal and groundwater response of fmfield geologic media to a nuclear excursion. This model uses a high spatial resolution version of the computitiona.1 code BR4GFL0_T, which is an existing Sandia National Laboratories code, to analyze the transient 2-phase flow of groundwater and gas resulting from typical excursions predicted by the UDX model. The results identified the time behavior of temperature for the fissile assembly zone and the groundwater saturation. From these results, the maximum frequency of occurrence of nuclear excursions could be estimated for far-field scenarios, given temperature recovery and resaturation behavior (see Figure ES-9) .
ES.4.3 UDX Model (Uncoupled Nuclear Dynamics Model)
The UDX model uses the computational code NARK, which was generated as part of the NDCA project. This code was developed to determine the transient behavior (nuclear dynamics) of the neutron population in a critical assembly (uncoupled ii-em groundwater effects) by using the classical point-reactor model. Output from NARK is used to identi~the power history of a nuclear excursio~total number of fissions from the excursio~and the duration of a single excursion. Input parameters include: fissile material type, delayed neutron lifetimes, half-lives of delayed neutron groups, initial conditions (power, reactivity, and select output from the R.Keff code (e.g., fissile mass).
ES.4.4 DTHX Model (Fully-Coupled Nuclear Dynamics Model)
The DTHX model is comprised of the THX and UDX models coupled together resulting in the code DINO. This computational code was generated from the NARK and BRAGFLO_T codes. It models i%lly-coupled (neutronics and repository response) far-field nuclear dynamics excursions. Since this computational code is large and is computationally intensive, it was only used for a small set of analysis runs. The output was compared to results from UDX model and identified that UDX results give conservative estimates of the transient behavior of the neutron population during an excursion. Thus, large parametric studies for excursion consequences could be obtained from UDX model. --
ES.4.5 PRA Model (Probabilistic Risk Analysis Model)
The PIL4 model uses the Monte Carlo simulation code SLAM, which is an existing Idaho NationaI Engineering and Environmental Laboratory code. It was used to model time-dependent events such as groundwater infiltratio~canister degradation, SNF cladding degradation, dissolution of fissile material, radionuclides, neutron poison material, etc., and transport of the material to other geologic Iocations. For the PRA analyses, faultievent tree methodology was combined with the use of the Monte Carlo simulations performed with SLAM (see Chapter 6). Although there is good confidence in the computational code used in the model, there is considerable uncertainty in the input data used at this time and the results are considered to be at the ROM (rough-order-of-magnitude) level. Ongoing work in this area should yield updated model results in the fiture. The most important result produced from this model is the estimated probabilities for initiation of a criticality.
ES.5 Results
The general findings fi-om this study are as follows: Near-field or internal criticality is possible only if significant separation of fissile material and neutron absorbers occur by chemical processes and/or other mechanisms. The consequences of a critical excursion are minimal in terms of energy release (temperature rise) and impact on fission yield product inventories for plausible conditions. The probabilities for criticali~initiators were determined to be very small. The net impact of the resulting criticality fissions on the radiological source term is very small and may not contribute to ov&all repository perfom-iance assessment. Contributions to the annual effective dose by criticality are less than the round-off of the computed PA values. Several specific findings are itemized below
ES.5.1 Criticality Potential Parametric Study
Over 30,000 eigenvalue calculations for the fissile material/geometries were investigated using the CX model. These calculations were used to identi~the relationship between fissile mass and fissile concentration necessary to yield a critical assembly. Figures ES-2 to ES-6 are examples of typical results identif@g the relationship between fissile mass and concentrations. In the NDCA study, S-curves were generated for over 30 scenarios corresponding to fissile material in near-fields consisting of rust and concrete/''host rock" materials and also for far-fields consisting of Topopah Springs tuff host rock. The following key criticality features were identified from the S-curves: A) Low enrichment fissile material (less than 2% enrichment) do not achieve delayed criticality in fro-field geometries, even for infinite geometries. Enrichments greater than 2% will require significant fissile mass quantities, which may not be possible to accumulate in a single concentrated far-field location. PA results should identifi that the required accumulation of fissile material is not possible. B) Generating a critical assembly requires substantial fissile mass and concentration in combination with ideal conditions (i.e., worst-case geometries, significant moderation due to groundwater, removal of neutron poisons, etc.,). For far-field locations, fissile --concentrations greater than 7 kg/m3 are required and depending on the enrichment, fissile masses greater than 200 kg may also be required for expected far-field enrichments ( Figure ES-5 ). For near-field locations that involve rust slumps, very large fissile concentrations, greater than 50 kg/m3, are required. The fissile mass necessary for criticality for the near-field is strongly dependent on the enrichment of the fissile material, with masses as low as 7 kg only for very ideal conditions (enrichments greater than 80%, no neutron posions, significant porosity that is near fiM saturation, etc.,). However, these conditions are not likely to exist. Existing criticality studies for degraded and partially degraded internal geometries indicated that masses greater than 10 kg would be required for highly-enriched uranium (HEU)
without neutron poisons under nominal conditions, and masses greater than 14.4 kg are needed for HEU when 10/0of the original neutron poisons are remaining. There are combinations of fissile mass and concentration (for enrichments greater than 20'Yo) for which it is technicdy possible to achieve delayed criticality in nearfield geometries that include a mixture of highly enriched fissile material and rust. However, the fissile concentrations (in the absence of neutron poisons) necessary to accomplish this are substantial (excess of 10 kg/m3) and when considering the geochemistry in the repository environment and allowed fissile masses individual packages, it may not be plausible for these fissile concentrations to ever occur. PA results for container degradation will be needed to generate FEPs screening arguments for this scenario.
Results indicate that the presence of reflector material (the tuff host rock surrounding the critical zone) has a significant impact on the required critical mass but not on the fissile concentration. (Thus, the effect of the addition of a reflector is that the corresponding S-curve is translated down in fissile mass but not to the left or right in fissile concentration.) Models lacking in reflector geometries may slightly overestimate minimum required fissile masses.
ES.5.2 Excursion Consequences
A large parametric nuclear dynamics analysis was pefiormed in this study using the DTHX and UDX models. The calculations were used to identi~the relationship between net excursion fissions and criticality assembly parameters (i.e., mass, temperature feedback properties, etc.). These calculations were performed with these two models at different levels of detail. The more detailed model (DTHX) is termed "fi.dly-coupled" nuclear dynamics. This model is sophisticated in that it couples the time behavior model for the neutron population (and hence power and fission production) with the transient multiphase model for the combined thermal hydrology and transport of unsaturated groundwater. The DTHX model is computationally intensive and is used for select studies for far-field criticality. The second consequence model is less detailed and is termed "Uncoupled" nuclear dynamics (UDX). This model analyzes only the time behavior of the neutron population and does not model spatial effects. Since it is cornputationrdly efficient it was used for parametric sensitivity analysis. Comparison of this model to the "fully-coupled" nuclear dynamics indicated that its results are conservative ( Figure ES-7) and can be used for bounding calculations. Since the uncoupled nuclear dynamics is not related to the spatial geometry of the fissile mass, its results are applicable to in situ, near-field, or fa-field analysis. The UDX model results .-are used to identi@ the net impact upon the radiological source term due to a single nuclear excursion in terms of additional fission yield products. The nuclear dynamics calculations (DTHX and UDX) identified the following:
A) The number of net fissions from a typical excursion are very low and are similar to values previously experienced in criticality accidents involving aqueous solutions with fissile material. Typical net-fissions are computed to be in the range of 1017to 1020 fissions per excursion. These computed values are in good comparison to published vahes for criticality accidents involving aqueous systems (see Frolov 1995 , Paxton 1980 , and Stratton 1989 . B) When comparing "filly-coupled" nuclear dynamics DTHX computational results to "Uncoupled" nuclear dynamics (UDX) results, it was identified that UDX results are consemative (see Figure ES-7) . Since the UDX model does not include groundwater modeling, which is computationally intensive, the UDX model was used to investigate the sensitivity of excursion fissions upon various neutronic model parameters. The UDX calculations resulted in the further understanding of the nuclear excursions and yielded a simple relationship (see Figure ES-8 ). An important feature of this relationship is that the numbti of net fissions is strongly dependent on the inventory of fissiIe material in a critical assembly. Since the fissile mass is limited by S-curve quantities, the fissions are expected to be very low for conceivable situations leading to an excursion. 
ES5.3. Thermal Hydrology Simulations
A small parametric study was performed with the THX model to investigate the transient response of the repository media as if it experienced a nuclear excursion. Excursion power profiles correspond to typical energy released as predicted by the UDX and DTHX models. The thermal hydrology calculations were used for select f=-field geometries to determine the temperature and saturation recycle times. (These correspond to the elapsed time after an excursion that is necessary to return to initial temperature and saturation conditions.) These calculations were used to estimate the frequency for multiple excursions that may occur after an initial critical assembly is generated. The thermal hydrology/groundwater transport calculations (THX) identified the following: A)
B)
Even though the UDX and DTHX models indicated low net excursion fissions, there are significant groundwater temperature and saturation effects. Since it is necessary to restore the initial groundwater conditions to initiate another excursion, these effects are important in order to identifi the bounding frequencies (recycle times) for occurrence of repeated nuclear excursions.
Computational results indicated that groundwater saturation recycle times are longer than groundwater temperature recycle times. Also the saturation times are significantly long and preclude a continuous "slow cooker" power operation. This is due mainly to the unpressurized characteristics of the unsaturated tuff host rock. Typical THX results can be seen in Figure 
ES.5.4 Probability for Criticality Initiators
A Monte Carlo simulation was performed in the PRA model for events (such as groundwater infiltration, container corrosion, etc.) that may cumulatively result in the generation of an initial criticality. These probability va.hes, when multiplied with the consequences of multiple excursions (for only those SNFS that have the potential to yield a critical assembIy), will yield "risk". The metric used in this study for risk is "additional fissions" which can be directly compared to the initial radiological source term. The PRA model added valuable information on the probability for an initial criticality. This PRA model, using the SLti code, computed criticality probability frequencies under glacial and non-gIacial conditions. The resuits indicated a "worst case" (under persistent glacial conditions) probability of 2.2 containers undergoing criticality over 100,000 year duration (2.2x10-5/yr). "Present day" conditions yielded a probability frequency of only 0.07 containers undergoing criticality over 100,000 year duration (7x10-7/yr). Thus the PRA model (using PA corrosion submodels and results) identified that these fissile masses and their corresponding concentrations have very small probabilities of occurrence.
ES.5.5. GeneraI ResuIts
The major NDCA findings indicate that the disposal of DOE SNF in volcanic tufftypical of the Yucca Mountain Site (yMS) result in: (1) probability frequency of initial criticaliõ f 7x10-7 criticality initiators/yr (under present day conditions), (2) range of 3 to 30 criticaIities/yr (Iimited by geohydrology), and (3) range of 10]7to 1020fissions/criticality. Thus the nominal risk associated with criticality is given by: Risk = Consequences x ES-15 Frequency = 5X1018 (fissions/criticality) x 7x10-7 (initial critics.lities/yr) x 15 (criticalities/yr-initial criticality) x 100 yr (an assumed duration of repeated criticalities) = 5.3x1 015additional fissions per year. This risk is extremely small when compared to the initiaI YMS source term of -6xl 031fissions.
ES.6 Conclusions
The risk values presented in this paper are comparable to previous estimates, even when using PRA model results at the ROM level. Updates to the PRA model are currently taking place, but they are not expected to significantly alter the net outcomes of the" NDCA study. The overall finding of this report is that nuclear criticality is not a si~nificant contributor to post-closure re~osito ry releases to the accessible environment. The NDCA study results indicate that it is nearly impossible to generate a critical assembly in near-and far-field geometries and that the risks of criticality are below the roundoff for the radionuclide inventory source term. Since the risks are below the "noise", there is no risk-based justification for application of criticality safety (k-effective< 0.95) guidelines for repository post-closure conditions.
Resources are better appIied to engineered features that may reduce annual effective doses due to groundwater transport of radionuclide inventory.
ES.7 Potential Benefits of Model Enhancements
Much of the technical work in this study is based on preliminary dati, thus the results have significant uncertainty. Future work is not likely to significantly affect the general implications of the technical findings, but it may aid in the defensibility of the models. There are three areas where NDCA model enhancements would be beneficial:
1)
2)
3) PM Model Upgrading the PRA model would result in better confidence for criticality probabiiif requencies. At presen~the model uses preliminary corrosion data and incomplete corrosion submodels. These submodels are currently being upgraded within the Yucca Mountain PA project&d maybe available in the near fbture. These updated models along with refinement in the input data till aid the defensibility of the PRA model. Results, if accepted, should continue to indicate that criticality does not have a signMcant impact to the releases to the accessible environment.
Nuclear Cross Sections
Only for unique SNFS with enrichments close to pure U-235, nuclear cross sections --may be processed for use in evahating the Doppler temperature coefficient (DTC), which when combined with the leakage due to small changes in geometry (e.g., surface-to-volume ratio) results in the prompt feedback coefficient. This evaluation would only be necessary to show that the range of prompt feedback coefficients used in this study include the fuel type in question.
PA Results
ES-16
